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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the optimal accumulation of capital stock, external debt and reputation 
by explicitly incorporating the inclination o f a sovereign country to service its external 
liabilities and the adverse effects of not meeting foreign loans’ commitments on the 
country’s trustworthy reputation. Repudiation and loss of reputation might limit the 
country’s access to international markets of credit, consumer and capital goods; and 
subsequently might result in a higher average cost of servicing the country’s future external 
liabilities, less favorable terms of trade with the rest of the world and accelerated 
depreciation of capital stock.
* Amnon Levy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, 
New South Wales, Australia.
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1 . INTRODUCTION
Since 1973 the external debts of the developing countries have been growing at an 
unprecedented rate. This has led to a heightened concern about these countries’ ability and 
commitment to service and repay their liabilities. This concern is rooted in the fact that a 
country’s external debt is a sovereign debt and, unlike a private debt, it is not subject to 
laws regarding bankruptcy and enforcement of collateral. Thus, when the potential 
penalties on default are insufficient, a rise in the country’s degree of indebtedness increases 
the country’s inclination to repudiate some, or all, of its external liabilities. However, as 
has been suggested by Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz (1981) and Kenneth Keltzer 
(1984), it is possible that the extent of repudiation is limited by the country’s concern about 
the adverse effect of a default on its trustworthy reputation and, subsequently, on its access 
to foreign loans. The role of reputation, in conjunction with the desire for continued access 
to external loans, as a deterrent for repudiation have been analysed further by Herschel 
Grossman and John Van Huyck (1988), who distinguished between justifiable and 
excusable defaults and unjustifiable and inexcusable defaults and derived a reputation 
equilibrium in which the lenders’ expectations about contingent debt servicing are 
validated. By assuming that small countries face competitive foreign investors, Jeremy 
Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff (1989) have disputed the role of the ‘reputation for repayment’ 
as a support for extending loans to small countries and have argued that lending to these 
countries should be supported by direct sanctions.
The present paper incorporates both the reputational argument and the possibility of 
an implementation of trade sanctions against a defaulting country into the analysis of 
external debt and capital accumulation within an intertemporal utility maximisation 
framework. In this framework, the indebted country choses the paths of consumption, 
import, export and repudiation of external liabilities so as to maximise the sum of the 
discounted utilities from consumption over an infinite planning horizon while taking into 
account the evolution of its production capacity, external debt and reputation. In addition to
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the potentially adverse effect of a deterioration in its trustworthy reputation on access to 
foreign loans, the motion equations of the indebted country’s capital stock and external debt 
also incorporate the possibility of lenders’ retaliation by limiting the country’s access to 
international markets. Trade sanctions against the defaulting country are likely to reduce the 
revenues from export, increase the payments on imports and accelerate the depreciation of 
capital items whose maintenance depends on foreign spare parts and skill.
The details of this analysis are presented in the following sections. Section 2 displays 
the indebted country’s intertemporal utility maximisation as an optimal control problem in 
which the control variables are consumption, import, export and rate of repudiation; and the 
state variables are capital, external debt and reputation. It also derives the necessary 
conditions for maximum. Section 3 analyses the characteristics of the optimal trajectories of 
the control and state variables. Section 4 describes the steady-state levels of repudiation, 
reputation, import, capital, output and external debt.
2 . DYNAMIC MODEL OF OPTIMAL DEBT ACCUMULATION AND 
REPUDIATION WITH CONSIDERATION FOR RETALIATION
The analysis of capital, external debt and reputation accumulation is based on the 
assumption that the indebted country choses the paths of consumption, import, export and 
the rate of repudiation of external liabilities so as to maximise the sum of the discounted 
utilities from consumption during an infinite horizon, while taking into account the effects 
of repudiation and retaliatory sanctions on the country’s capital stock, external debt and 
reputation. The choice of an infinite time interval is to enable the assessment of long-run 
(steady state) effects.
In mathematical notations, the sovereign’s decision problem is portrayed as
maximising f °  e‘Pl u(ct)dt (1)
(c,m,x,v) o
subject to state-transition equations:
Kt = f(Kt,m t ) - c t - x t -5(R t)K t (2)
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Dt = q(Rt)mt - p(Rt)xt + r(Rt) (1 - Vt) D t (3)
Rt = - P (vt - v*). (4)
Here,
u = the sovereign’s instantaneous utility, 
p = the sovereign’s rate of time preference, p>0 ,
K = the country’s capital stock in physical units,
D = the country’s amount of external debt in dollars,
R = the sovereign’s trustworthy reputation —  R>0, and larger values 
of R indicate higher reputation, 
c = the country’s consumption level in physical units, 
m = the country’s import level in physical units, 
x = the country’s export level in physical units, 
v = the rate of repudiation of external liabilities, 0 <v<l, 
v* = the excusable rate of repudiation,
(3 = the reputational loss’ parameter, P>0,
8  = the rate of capital’s depreciation,
f  = the aggregate production function (aggregate production is
measured in physical units), 
q = the aggregate price of imported goods in dollars, 
p = the aggregate price of exported goods in dollars, 
r  = the average cost of servicing the external debt, and
t = the time index.
It is assumed that:
1. The instantaneous utility is a concave function of consumption: u ' > 0 and u"  < 0, 
u '(0 ) = °° and u'(°°) = 0 .
2. The aggregate production is a concave function of capital and imported inputs: %  >
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0, fm > 0, f(0,m) — f(K,0) — 0, fKK < fmm < 0 ar*d fKR^mm " fKmfmK > 0.
3. The average cost of servicing the external debt rises as the indebted country’s 
reputation declines, i.e. rR  < 0 .
4. The rate of capital depreciation increases as the country’s reputation declines due to 
retaliatory measures implemented by lending countries including a spare-part 
embargo, i.e. 8 r  < 0 ;
5. Due to a greater degree of isolation and loss of world markets, the prices of imported 
goods rise and the prices of exported goods go down as the indebted country’s 
reputation declines, i.e. qR < 0  and pR > 0 .
6 . There exists an interior solution to the optimal-control problem. This assumption is 
compatible with the empirical evidence that, in most cases, repudiation is partial and 
retaliatory sanctions are limited rather than total or nil.
In this optimal-control problem, c(t), m(t), x(t) and v(t) are the control functions; and 
K(t), D(t) and R(t) are the state variables. The maximum principle developed by Pontryagin 
et al (1962) implies that if the control functions and the corresponding trajectories of the 
state variables maximise the objective function 1 subject to the state-transition equations 2 - 
4, there exist continuously differentiable co-state functions Ai(t), ^ 2 (t) and ^ 3 (t), such that 
the optimal control functions and the corresponding state and co-state functions 
simultaneously satisfy the state-transition equations, the co-state transition (or adjoint) 
equations and the optimality conditions. These transition equations and optimality 
conditions can be derived by considering the Hamiltonian (H) associated with the 
constrained intertemporal decision problem described by equations 1 to 4:
H = e-ptu(c) + X.i[f(K,m)-c-x-8 (R)K]+A.2 [q(R)m-p(R)x+r(R)(l-v)D]-A.3 P(v-v*)
(5)
where, for convenience, the time index t is omitted. In this context, the co-state variables 
Ai, A2  and A.3 can be interpreted as the shadow values (in utiles) of infinitesimal increments 
in the country’s capital stock, amount of external debt and level of international reputation,
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respectively. The first term on the right-hand side (r.h.s.) indicates the direct contribution 
of current consumption to the overall level of utility, whereas the second, third and fourth 
terms on the r.h.s. display the indirect contributions of current net investment, borrowing 
and repudiation of external liabilities, respectively, to the sovereign’s overall utility level 
through altering future consumption possibilities.
In addition to the state-transition equations, the necessary conditions include the
adjoint equations
X l = - M f K (K ,m )- 8 (R)] (6 )
l 2  = ->-2 r(R)(l-v) (7)
^ 3  = 5r K-X-2 [qR - pR x + rR(l - v)D] (8 )
and the optimality conditions
Hc = e -P tu ' ( c ) -X i= 0  (9)
Hm = Xi fm (K,m) + X2 q(R) = 0 (10)
Hx = - A,i - X.2 p(R) = 0  ( 1 1 )
Hv = - ^-2 r(R) D - X,3 P = 0. (12)
Finally, the transversality conditions require that, from the sovereign’s perspectives, 
there is no value to the terminal levels of capital, external debt and reputation. As long as 
the sovereign’s rate of time preference is positive, these conditions are also satisfied in the 
case where the terminal levels of the state variables are positive.
The time differentials o f the optimality conditions 9-12 yield singular-control 
equations describing the transitions of the control variables. The singular-control equations, 
the adjoint equations 6 - 8  and the state-transition equations 2-4 constitute a system of non­
linear differential equations. Due to its size and complexity, it is impossible to solve this 
system and identify its asymptotic properties without additional strong assumptions and a
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substantial loss of generality. Thus, the following sections present only some essential 
features of the optimal paths of the control and state variables and the steady-state levels of 
these variables.
3 . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPTIMAL TRAJECTORIES
The adjoint equation 6  requires that, along the optimal path, the rate of change in the 
shadow price of capital is equal to the difference between the capital’s rate of depreciation 
and the marginal product of capital. The optimality condition 9 indicates that at any instance 
within the planning horizon the shadow price of capital should be equal to the marginal 
utility from current consumption and thus reflect the trade-off between current consumption 
and future consumption.
The adjoint equation 7 requires that along the optimal path the rate of change in the 
shadow value of external debt is equal, in absolute terms, to the repudiation-free interest 
rate (1 - v)r. Furthermore, the optimality condition 11 implies that the ratio of the shadow 
prices of capital and external debt should be equal to the price of the country’s export, and 
in recalling the optimality condition 9:
X2  = -e-ptu'(c)/p(R). (13)
By substituting 13 and 9 into the optimality condition 10 for Xi and X2 we obtain further 
that along the optimal path the marginal product of the imported inputs should be equal to 
the country’s import-export price ratio:
fm(K,m) = q(R)/p(R). (14)
Note further that since the country’s import-export price ratio declines with R and since the 
marginal product of imported inputs is diminishing, the greater the country’s trustworthy 
reputation the larger the amount of imported goods along the optimal path.
The optimality condition 12 implies that along the optimal path the rate of repudiation 
of external liabilities is such that the marginal gains (in utiles) from lowering the costs of
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servicing the country’s external debt are offset by the adverse effect of the loss of 
reputation on present and future consumption and utility levels. By substituting equation 13 
into the optimality condition 1 2 , the shadow value of an infinitisimal increase in the 
country’s reputation can be expressed as
X3 =r(R)D e-rtu'(c)/Pp(R). (15)
By differentiating the optimality condition 9 with respect to t it can be shown
-pe-pt u'(c) + e-pt u"(c) c - = 0  (16)
and in recalling conditions 6  and 9 we obtain
c = -[fK (K,m) - 8 (R) - p]u'(c)/u"(c). (17)
Similar to the optimal growth theory’s proposition (e.g. Cass, 1965), equation 17 implies 
that, given that the sovereign’s marginal utility is diminishing, the consumption increases, 
remains the same, or decreases over time if the marginal product of capital is greater, equal, 
or smaller than the rental (or user) cost of capital ( 8  + p). This effect of the marginal net 
return on capital is amplified by the degree of concavity of the sovereign’s utility function. 
Note that in this framework, the marginal product of capital increases (decreases) with the 
amount of the imported inputs when K and m are complementaries (substitutes) in 
production, and the rental cost of capital declines with the country’s level of reputation.
By taking the time differential of the optimality condition 11
-Xl - i 2 P(R) - tep(R ) R = 0 (18)
and in recalling conditions 6 , 7, 9 and 11 it can be shown that the transition o f the 
country’s international reputation is given by
R = {(1 - v)r(R) - [fK (K,m) - 8 (R)] p(R)}/pR(R). (19)
Since pR is assumed to be positive, whenever the repudiation-free interest rate is greater,
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equal, or smaller than the foreign exchange receipts from exporting the net marginal 
product of capital, the country’s reputation increases, remains the same, or decreases, 
respectively. The change in the country’s reputation is amplified by the vulnerability of the 
country’s export to retaliatory measures implemented by the lending countries as indicated 
by the export price’s derivative w.r.t. R. Note that for given levels of K and m, the higher 
the country’s reputation the lower the repudiation-free interest rate and the greater the 
foreign exchange receipts from exporting the net marginal product of capital and hence the 
greater the country’s inclination to repudiate and lower its reputation.
The time differential of the optimality condition 12 implies
- i 2 r(R)D - X2 [rR (R) DR + r(R)D] - A* p = 0 (20)
• ©
and by substituting conditions 7 and 8  into equation 20 for X2 and A.3 , respectively, and in 
recalling that along the optimal path A,i and X2 behave in accordance with condition 1 1 , it 
can be shown that
r(R)2(l-v)D - rR(R)DR-r(R)D + pfqRin-pRX+rR (l-v)D + p(R) 8r(R)K] = 0. (21)
By dividing both sides of equation 21 by r(R)D and rearranging terms, it can be shown that 
along the optimal path the instantaneous rate of change in the country’s external debt is 
given by
5  = ®  [(1‘v)rR + P(R) 8 r  (K/D) + (qRm-PRx)/D - i-rR/P] + (1-V) r(R). (22)
Equation 22 and the assumptions that 8 r  < 0, qR < 0 and pR > 0 indicate that the higher the
country’s leverage (D/K) and the lower the sensitivity of the country’s import and export 
prices to changes in reputation, the higher the optimal rate of external debt accumulation.
9
4 . STEADY-STATE LEVELS OF REPUDIATION, REPUTATION, 
IMPORT, CAPITAL STOCK OUTPUT AND EXTERNAL DEBT 
•  •  ®
By setting R=0 in equations 4,19 and 22, c=0 in equation 17, and D--0 in equation 
2 2 , we obtain that in steady state (ss):
Vss = v* (23)
(1  - vss) r(Rss) - [fK (Kss, m ss) - § (R ss)]p (R ss) =  0 (24)
fK (Kss, mss) = 8 (Rss) +p (25)
B
r (R s s )  [(1  - v ss)rR(R ss) '' P (R ss)S r ( R ss) (K ss/ D ss)  +  (q R(R ss)m ss '  P r ( R ss) x ss) / D ss]
+ (1 ■ vss) r(Rss) = 0. (26)
The steady-state levels o f repudiation and reputation
Equation 23 indicates that in steady state the country’s rate of repudiation of external 
debt should be equal to the excusable rate. The substitution of 23 and 25 into equation 24 
implies that the steady-state level of the country’s reputation should be such that the 
repudiation-free interest rate is equal to the sovereign’s rate of time preference times the 
stationary price of the country’s export:
( l - v * ) r ( R ss) = pp(Rss) (27)
By taking the total differential of equation 27 and in recalling that 0 < v* < 1, rR < 0 and 
pR > 0  we obtain that the higher the excusable repudiation rate and the rate o f time
preference, the lower the country’s reputation in steady state:
dRss___________ r(Rss)
dv* < 0  (28)( 1  - v*) rR(R ss) - p p R(R ss) 
and
dRss ___________ P(Rss)__________ < q (29)
dp ( 1  - v*) rR(R ss) - p p R(R ss)
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The above derivatives suggest further that the more sensitive the average cost of 
servicing the external debt and the price of export to changes in the country’s reputation, 
the smaller the effect of an increase in either the excusable reputation rate or the rate of time 
preference on the steady-state level of the country’s reputation.
In order to explore further the effects of the responses of r and p to changes in R on 
the country’s reputation in steady state let us consider the following linear forms:
r = rmax ■ r lR rmax> r i > 0 (30)
and
P = Pmin + PlR  Pmin, Pi > 0 (31)
where rmax and pmin are the average cost of servicing the external debt and the aggregate 
price of export when the country’s reputation reaches the lowest level (i.e., R=0), 
respectively, and r i and pi indicate the sensitivities o f the average contracted interest rate 
and price of export to changes in the country’s reputation, respectively. The substitution of 
these forms into equation 27 leads to the following close-form solution to the country’s 
stationary level of reputation:
(1 ' v *)rmax “ PPmin
ss —
PP1 + r i (1 - V*)
(32)
This solution implies
dRss (1 - v*)
dr,max pri + r i ( l  - v*)
> 0  (33)
- f ^ L  = ----------=2---------- < 0  (34)
apmin p r i + r i ( l - v * )
.  - d - V )  [(l-v*)rmax - PPmin] |  „ as |  p
dri [ppi + r i ( l  - v* )]2 > <
1  o as (l-v*)rmax I  ppmi„.




The steady-state levels o f  import, capital and production
In order to find the steady-state levels of import (mss), capital (Kss) and production 
(yss), consider the following Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function
y = K«i m«2 0 < a i ,  a 2  < 1 (37)
Then, in recalling equations 14 and 25 it can be shown that the marginal products of 
imported inputs and capital in steady state should be equal to:
a 2  Kss« l mss«2-l = q(Rss)/p(Rss) (38)
a iK ssal-lm ss“2 = 8(Rss) + p. (39)
Equations 38 and 39 indicate that the steady-state levels of import and capital are such that:
Kss = ( a  / a  } ^ ( Rss)/p(R$g) (40)
8 (R SS) + p
a j 1-oq
mss = f 5 (R ss) + P \ -« 2+al a2 f q(R ss) Y c t2+ai a 2 (4 1 )
V «1 )  P(Rss)J
l-a2 2(l+aj a2)-ai
q(Rss)K ss = + -a2+ai a2
a i a 2 P(Rss)J
1 (l-a2+ai a 2) _ (42)
The steady-state level of output can be found by substituting equations 41 and 42 in the 
aggregate production function.
Equation 40 implies that, for a given level of reputation, the steady-state ratio of 
capital to imported inputs in production:
1 . increases with the capital-import’s production elasticities ratio,
2 . increases with the import-export price ratio in steady state,
3. decreases with the rate of depreciation of capital in steady state, and
4. decreases with the sovereign’s rate of time preference.
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Moreover, equations 41 and 42 indicate that, for a given level of reputation, Kss, mss, and 
subsequently yss, increase with: 1 . the depreciation rate of capital, 2 . the rate of time 
preference, and 3. the import-export’s price ratio.
Note, however, that the effect of the country’s steady-state reputation level on the 
capital-import ratio is not clear, since both the import-export’s price ratio and the capital’s 
depreciation rate— appearing in the numerator and denominator o f equation 40, 
respectively— decline with Rss. Therefore, if the import-export’s price ratio is more (less) 
sensitive than the capital’s depreciation rate to changes in R, the lower the country’s 
reputation the more (less) capital intensive the country’s production process in steady state.
Note further that the effect of the rate of time-preference (i.e. the degree of myopia) 
on the capital-import ratio in steady state is not obvious once the country’s reputation is not 
held constant. On the one hand, and as indicated above, an increase in the rate of time- 
preference directly raises the rental costs of capital and hence moderates the steady-state’s 
capital-import ratio. On the other hand, and in view of equation 32, an increase in the rate 
of time preference lowers the country’s reputation and hence indirectly affects the capital- 
import ratio in accordance with the relative sensitivity of the capital’s depreciation rate and 
the import-export’s price ratio. Thus, the fu ll effect of the rate of time preference is clear 
only in the case where the import-export price ratio is less sensitive than the rate of capital 
depreciation to changes in the country’s reputation. In this case, both the direct and indirect 
effects of an increment in the rate of time preference are negative and hence reduce the 
stationary capital-import ratio. When the import-export’s price ratio is more sensitive than 
the depreciation rate to changes in the country’s reputation, the indirect effect of an 
increment in the rate of time preference on the stationary capital-import ratio in the 
production process is positive and offsets the direct effect.
The steady-state level o f external debt
__ # •By setting D and R to be equal to zero in equation 21 the country’s external debt in 
steady state (Dss) is given by
13
^  [pR(Rss)xss ■ (Rss)m ssl '  P(Rss) S r (Rss) Kss
U cc — “ . (4 j )
(1 - v*) [rR (R ss) + r(R ss)2 /P]
In recalling the assumptions that pR is positive and qR and 8 r  are negative, it is clear that
the numerator is positive. However, in view of the assumption that the contracted interest 
rate decreases as the country’s reputation rises (i.e. rR < 0 ), the sign of the denominator of
the term on the r.h.s. of equation 43 is not clear and hence
Dss|0 a s r ( R s s ) | ^  (44)
where Ess is the stationary elasticity (in absolute terms) of the contracted interest rate with 
respect to the indebted country’s reputation. As can be expected, the more sensitive the 
country’s reputation to repudiation (i.e. the larger the (3) the smaller the country’s external 
liabilities in steady state, and for a sufficiently large P and contracted interest rate elasticity 
it is possible that the initially indebted country will be a net creditor in steady state, 
provided that the steady-state is reached. Equation 43 indicates further that the size of Dss, 
in absolute terms, increases with: 1 . the country’s steady-state levels of import, export, 
capital stock and the price of export; and 2 . the sensitivity of the export’s price, import’s 
price and capital depreciation rate to changes in the country’s reputation. It is important to 
note further that an increment in the excusable rate of repudiation directly increases the 
stationary level of external debt if  rss > bE/Rss. However, in recalling equation 28, the 
direct effect of v* on Dss is likely to be indirectly moderated by the deterioration in the 
country’s stationary level of reputation.
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